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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARK 0. HAROLDSEN, INC., d/b/a ] 
MARKO ENTERPRISES, a Utah ] 
corporation, ] 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ] 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, an agency ] 
of the State of Utah, ] 
Defendant-Respondent. ' 
I Case No. 870468 
i (Priority Classification 14b 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
MARK 0. HAROLDSEN, INC. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the taxpayer's lease or purchase of mailing 
lists contained on magnetic computer tape or^  preprinted labels 
constitute a use of "tangible personal property" within the 
meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-3 (repealed; superseded by 
Section 59-12-103(l)(k) and (1) (1987))? 
2. Was the taxpayer's payment to the owners of the 
mailing lists a payment primarily for services and for 
intangible information rather than for the lease or purchase of 
"tangible personal property"? 
3. Is Mark 0. Haroldsen, Inc., entitled to a refund 
of taxes paid in connection with the use of the mailing lists 
obtained from the magnetic tapes and printed lists? 
4. Is Utah Code Ann. 59-16-3 ambiguous in its 
provisions regarding taxation of "tangible personal property" 
and should the ambiguity be resolved in favor of the taxpayer? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from the dismissal with prejudice of 
plaintifffs Complaint against the Utah State Tax Commission as 
ordered by the lower court in its Order Disposing of Reciprocal 
Motions for Summary Judgments and Affirming Decision of Utah 
State Tax Commission, entered on November 12, 1987. (R. 
120-25.) 
B. Disposition of the Case Below. 
Plaintiff-appellant Mark 0. Haroldsen, Inc., (the 
"taxpayer" or the "Company") commenced this action by filing a 
Complaint and Appeal to Tax Division on May 28, 1985, appealing 
from an adverse ruling of the Utah State Tax Commission (the 
"Tax Commission"). (R. 2-6.) Defendant State Tax Commission 
filed an Answer on June 28, 1985. (R. 19-22.) The parties 
stipulated as to all of the evidence in this case. The lower 
court entered an order on the stipulation on September 10, 
1985. (R. 23-25.) Each of the parties filed a motion for 
summary judgment, which were argued at a hearing on April 14, 
1987. In a Memorandum Decision dated May 12, 1987, the court 
denied the taxpayer's motion for summary judgment and granted 
the Tax Commission's. (R. 103-10.) The court subsequently 
entered its Order Disposing of Reciprocal Motions for Summary 
Judgment and Affirming Decision of Utah State Tax Commission, 
on November 12, 1987, dismissing the case with prejudice. (R. 
120-25.) On December 2, 1987, the taxpayer liled a Notice of 
Appeal. (R. 126.) 
C, Statement of Facts. 
The taxpayer Mark 0. Haroldsen, Inc, is a company 
engaged in the business of marketing real estate information. 
It publishes books and tapes on real estate investment, and 
conducts real estate seminars. (Tr. 8-9.) As a marketing 
technique, the taxpayer engages in direct mail advertising. It 
mails to prospective customers circulars and advertisements 
relating to its products, and invitations relating to its 
seminars. (Tr. 9.) The Company obtains names and addresses 
for these mailings from mailing list brokers, either through 
leasing or purchasing the lists. During th^ period at issue, 
July 1, 1979, through June 30, 1982, the Conjpany paid a total 
of $154,844.10 to list brokers. (Tr. 14.) The issue in this 
The references to the transcript &re to the 
transcript of the formal hearing before the Utah State Tax 
Commission on February 20, 1985, which is included in the 
record on appeal. By the lower Court's order of September 10, 
1985, the transcript constitutes part of the stipulated facts 
in this case. (R. 23-25.) The facts set fofth in the Statement 
of Facts are not in dispute. 
case is whether the purchase of lists through the list brokers 
during the period in question constituted a use of "tangible 
personal propertyff within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 
59-16-3. 
The taxpayer most frequently used the services of 
Dependable Lists, a mailing list broker, during the period at 
issue, from whom the taxpayer purchased approximately 92 
percent of its lists. The taxpayer used Dependable Lists 
because of the excellent service it provided. (Tr. 15, 26.) 
In purchasing or leasing a mailing list, the taxpayer would 
typically contact a broker, such as Dependable Lists. The 
taxpayer would describe the particular product that it wanted 
to market and would often send a sample of the product to the 
broker for evaluation. Once the broker had examined the 
product to be marketed, it would suggest a number of lists for 
the taxpayer's review. After consultation with the broker, the 
taxpayer would choose from the broker's set of suggested 
lists. (Tr. 29, 33-34, 41-42.) 
Having selected a particular mailing list or lists, 
the taxpayer would then consult with the broker to refine the 
lists chosen. In the process of refining lists, the taxpayer 
relied heavily on the expertise of the broker. It was not 
unusual for the broker and the taxpayer to spend a great deal 
of time identifying the demographic characteristics of people 
most likely interested in the product to be marketed. Lists 
were refined by choosing the characteristics, or "selects," of 
the group of persons on the list to which the taxpayer desired 
to offer its products. (Tr. 29-31, 33-34, 40-43.) The 
categories, or "selects," requested by the company included 
sex, geographic locale, income bracket, home ownership, number 
of children, ages of children, subscribership to certain 
periodicals, the kinds of books purchased through the mail, and 
the types of prior investments. The taxpayer, in consultation 
with the list broker, would choose the appropriate selects, and 
the broker would refine the list on these criteria. Every list 
that the taxpayer used was refined in this fashion. (Tr. 30, 
51.) 
Having determined which selects to iise, the broker 
then uses a computer program to refine the list. The 
difficulty of the programming varies, depending on how 
complicated the selects are. (Tr. 94-95.) The primary 
expertise of the broker is more in determining which selects to 
i 
use rather than in the refining of the list through the 
computer program. (Tr. 95.) Where the taxpayer purchased the 
use of more than one list for the same marketing campaign, the 
I 
lists would be run through a computer to delete name 
duplicates, a process called "merge-purge." (Tr. 44-46.) 
The services of a list broker are critical to the 
taxpayer's direct mail campaigns. Payments to brokers are far 
more for services than for access to "raw," or unrefined, lists 
of names. "Raw" lists are not profitable in direct mailing. 
During the period at issue the taxpayer bought no "raw" lists. 
Each list purchased was substantially refined through the use 
of selects. The success or failure of a direct mail marketing 
campaign depends on the services of the broker in selecting 
proper lists and in refining the lists with proper selects. 
The cost of lists varies to reflect the amount of services 
rendered by the list broker, and the value of the information 
on the list. (Tr. 32, 41, 52-57, 62, 94-95.) 
Having refined the chosen list through the use of 
selects, the taxpayer would then place an order for the use of 
the list through the list broker. The taxpayer would send a 
sample of the "mailing piece" to the list broker who would, in 
turn, submit it to the list owner for approval. (Tr. 43). 
Once the mailing piece is approved, the list is processed and 
delivered to the taxpayer, which would then be allowed a 
limited, one-time license to use the mailing list. List owners 
seed the mailing list with coded "control" names in order to 
detect unauthorized use of the mailing list. (Tr. 12-13, 43, 
47.) 
The information rented by the taxpayer from the list 
owner is transferred to the taxpayer on computer tape or on 
preprinted labels. During the period in issu^, the taxpayer 
received 63.4 percent of its lists on labels, and 36.6 percent 
on computer tapes. Once the limited, one-time use of the tape 
has been made, the tape must be returned, erased, or 
destroyed. In situations when the tape may be kept, a separate 
fee is charged for the tape. (Tr. 11-14, 44, 46-47.) 
Following the formal hearing before the Tax 
Commission, the Commission found that the mailing lists were 
tangible personal property and upheld the challenged use tax 
assessment. The taxpayer paid the contested amount of 
$7,750.00, and commenced this action seeking a judgment that 
the assessment was erroneous and ordering a refund of that 
amount to the taxpayer. The tax division of the Third District 
Court for Salt Lake County also held that th£ lists were 
tangible personal property. It is from that determination that 
the taxpayer appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Because the lower court decided the case on 
stipulated facts, this Court should consider the matter on a de 
novo basis. 
2. The taxpayer purchased or leased mailing list 
information through out-of-state list brokeifs. The information 
was transferred through the medium of either magnetic tape or 
printed lists. The magnetic tapes and printed lists used by 
the taxpayer were incidental to the sale of services performed 
by the list brokers in preparing and refining the lists for the 
purposes of the taxpayer's marketing program. 
3. The magnetic tapes and printed lists used by the 
taxpayer were incidental to the purchase of intangible 
information. Every court that has considered the issue has 
held that mailing lists contained on magnetic tape are not 
taxable as tangible personal property. Computer software is 
analogous, which is also generally not held to be tangible 
personal property subject to a sales or use tax. 
4. Any ambiguities in the taxing statute, Section 
59-16-3, must be strictly construed and resolved in favor of 
the taxpayer. If the legislature intends that the state should 
tax the transfer of information by magnetic tape, or other 
similar means, it should specifically so provide by statute. 
The statute in question should not be given a forced 
interpretation to accommodate computer-age transfers of 
information which could be transferred by other means than 
magnetic tape or printed lists. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
BECAUSE THE FACTS WERE STIPULATED TO BY THE PARTIES 
THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE MATTER DE NOVO. 
The parties stipulated that the evidence adduced and 
stipulated to at the formal hearing before the State Tax 
Commission on February 20, 1985, including the transcript of 
hearing and all exhibits introduced at the hearing, constituted 
a full and complete record of all facts relevant to the subject 
matter of the action. On September 10, 1985> the lower court 
entered an order on the stipulation. (R. 23f25). Because the 
facts are not in dispute, but have been stipulated to, this 
Court should review the issues raised in this appeal de novo. 
The Court previously held in Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc. v. 
Great Northern Baseball Company, 748 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1987) 
that when a trial court relies on stipulated facts to decide a 
case, f,this court does not apply the clearly erroneous 
standard, but will sustain the lower court's decision only if 
convinced of its correctness. . . . Thus, we examine the facts 
de novo." Id. at 1060. 
II. 
THE MAGNETIC TAPES AND PRINTEt) LISTS 
USED BY THE TAXPAYER WERE INCIDENTAL TO 
A SALE OF INTANGIBLE SERVICES. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-3(a)(Supp. 1986) imposes a tax 
on "storage, use, or other consumption in this state of 
-9-
tangible personal property." For a transaction to be taxable 
under Section 59-16-3, two separate and independent elements 
must be present: (1) There must be a use of property, and (2) 
the property used must be tangible. Except for specific 
services as outlined in Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-3(b), there is 
no tax on the use of services. By its terms, the statute 
subjects only tangible personal property to taxation. The use 
of intangible property is not taxable. 
Not all transactions involving a use of property come 
within the terms of the statute. Property is often transferred 
incidentally in a sale of services. Tangible property is often 
transferred incidentally to a sale of services. The transfer 
of tangible property is often incidental to a sale of 
intangible property. Courts have recognized that transactions 
often mix taxable and non-taxable elements. Thus, in 
determining the taxability of such transactions under sales and 
use taxes, courts generally attempt to determine the "true or 
real object of the sale." For example, the "true object" test 
was applied in the case of Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating 
Corporation, 549 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1977). There the issue was 
whether the transfer of compiled statistical data on computer 
cards constituted the sale of tangible personal property. 
Holding in the negative, the court stated that "the true object 
-10-
of this transaction is not the data processing card as 
contended by the Comptroller, but the purchase of coded or 
processed data, an intangible." Id- at 168 (femphasis in 
original). See Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Director, Division of 
Taxation, 182 N.J. Super. 179, 440 A.2d 104, 117-18 (1981); 
Fingerhut Products Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 258 N.W.2d 
606 (Minn. 1977). 
This Court used a version of the "real object test" to 
determine the taxability of such "mixed" transactions in Thorne 
and Wilson, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, b81 P.2d 1237 
(Utah 1984). There, the Court upheld a district court's ruling 
that a sale of rare United States and foreign coins was a sale 
of tangible property. The Court noted that [i]t is the 
substance of the transaction and not the property actually 
transferred that controls. . . . In order to determine whether 
the metal tokens were sold as tangible personal property, the 
essence of the transaction must be examined/1 Id. at 1238 
(emphasis added) (quoting Michigan National ftank v. Department 
of Treasury, 127 Mich. App. 646, 339 N.W.2d 515, 517 (1983)). 
Thus, in determining the taxability of the cjase at issue, the 
"true object" or "essence of the transaction" of the sale must 
be determined. 
As noted above, there is no tax on [services under Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-16-3 (a). In this case, the Cjompany paid for the 
-11-
services of the mailing list broker. The evidence presented at 
the hearing before the Tax Commission demonstrated that the 
real object of the transaction was the purchase of the services 
of the list broker. Thomas Tolman testified that "the actual 
money paid, from our point of view, to the broker, is far more 
for the broker's services and what he is able to give us than 
it is for the actual tape and paper." (Tr. 54). All the lists 
rented by the company were selected and refined with the 
assistance of the list broker and its computer programmer, and 
were tailored to the company's needs. (Tr. 32, 41, 52-57, 62, 
94-95). The taxpayer relied on the list broker in selecting 
lists, and in pinpointing possible customers from each list. 
(Tr. 29, 43). A "raw" list has little, if any, value to the 
company. (Tr. 32, 94). 
Essentially, the list brokers used by the Company 
engaged in the service of gathering and collating demographic 
and marketing research and providing it to the Company to 
assist the Company's sales efforts. The lists purchased by the 
Company were not "canned" or "raw," but were specifically 
tailored to fit the individual needs of the Company. Courts in 
situations similar to the present case have found that tangible 
property transferred or used in a manner incidental to the sale 
of services did not involve a taxable use of tangible personal 
-12-
property. For instance, in Williams & Lee Scouting Service, 
Inc. v. Calvert, 452 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), the 
taxpayer provided the service of gathering information 
pertaining to oil and gas fields and then selling reports 
containing the information. The court held that the company 
provided a service and that the sale of the written reports was 
not a transfer of tangible personal property!. The court noted 
that the reporting of the information purchased by the taxpayer 
"can take any form from handwritten notes, telephone, or 
telegraph communications to printed material. The method of 
its communication is unimportant. The value lies in the 
intangible facts secured by the service." id. at 792. 
In Maccabees Mutual Life Insurance Company v. State, 
Department of Treasury, 122 Mich. App. 666, 332 N.W.2d 561 
(1983), the court considered whether a sale of computer 
software was a taxable transfer of tangible personal property 
under a statute virtually identical to Utah's. Observing that 
the software programs "represent a personalized service, 
customized to fit plaintiffs' particular computer 
configuration," the court held that the sale of the software 
was not taxable. Id. at 563-64. The Maccabees court cited 
University Microfilms v. Scio Township, 76 Mich. App. 616, 257 
N.W.2d 265 (1977), which considered whether master negative 
I 
microfilm copies of printed materials, rard books, periodicals, 
-13-
and other sources were personal property. The University 
Microfilms court distinguished the plaintiff's microfilms from 
computer software: 
We agree with plaintiff that its master 
negatives are similar to abstracts and computer 
'software' in that all contain information, but 
we disagree that that is what controls the 
determination of intangibility. The value of an 
abstract is personal, that is, it is dependent 
ton the work of the one who controls the 
information. If it is left to go out of date or 
is inaccurate rate, it loses its value. . . . 
Similarly, the value of computer "software" is 
not in the card or disc itself, but rather in 
the synthesization, compilation, organization 
and creation of the computer programs contained 
therein. . . . The value is personal. Payment 
is made for the service and the expert knowledge. 
275 N.W.2d at 267 (emphasis added; citations omitted). See 
Detroit Automobile Interinsurance Exchange v. Department of 
Treasury, 361 N.W.2d 373, 374-75 (Mich. App. 1985) (court held 
that sale of computer software was not taxable since the tapes 
and disks were not tangible personal property, but represented 
a service distinguished from TV games, albums, and cassette 
tapes); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. City of New York, 276 N.Y. 
198, 11 N.E.2d 728, 731 (1938) (court held that credit report 
prepared by taxpayer involved a service and was not a use of 
tangible personal property). 
The list brokers in the present case gather and 
categorize demographic marketing information which is of great 
value to the Company in its sales efforts. The brokers 
unquestionably provide a service for which the taxpayer should 
not be taxed. The one-time use of the lists by the taxpayer 
was not a taxable event. The tangibility of the physical 
magnetic tape was purely incidental to the real object of the 
transaction: the use of information resulting from the expert 
services of the list brokers with whom the taxpayer dealt. 
III. 
THE TAXPAYER PURCHASED INTANGIBLE 
INFORMATION, NOT TANGIBLE PROPERTY. 
A. The weight of authority recognizes that mailing lists 
are not tangible personal property and use thereof is 
not a taxable transaction. I 
The magnetic tapes and labels used by the taxpayer 
were not purchased for their tangible worth as tapes and 
labels, but rather for their value as a method of transmitting 
information. Every case that has considered the question 
raised by the present case had held that the use of mailing 
I 
lists contained on magnetic tape is not taxable as tangible 
personal property. In Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Director, 
Division of Taxation, 182 N.J.Super. 179, 440 A.2d 104 (1981), 
the court held that mailing lists transferred by magnetic tape 
were not tangible personal property. The court stated: 
Plaintiff is not subject to sales or use 
tax when it leases mailing lists. The 
leasing of computer information is not the 
leasing or sale of tangible personal 
property and is not taxable under dur act. 
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Plaintiff is leasing information. It is 
not leasing tangible personal property. 
The tapes which are tangible personal 
property and which transmit the information 
are only incidental to the underlying 
transaction between the parties. . . . 
The tapes are an inconsequential part of 
the transaction whose real object is the 
obtaining of mailing list information. 
. . . Under such circumstances the form of 
delivery of the information should not 
control its taxability. The inconsequential 
aspect of the magnetic tapes in the subject 
transactions may be compared to the 
inconsequential aspect of the paper used in 
connection with an accountant's services by 
way of reports or with an attorney's 
services by way of wills, other legal 
documents or letters giving advice. 
Id. at 117-18 (citations omitted). 
In Fingerhut Products Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
258 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 1977), the court reached an identical 
result in a case involving printed mailing lists. Observing 
that software on computer cards and tapes is analogous to the 
typed mailing lists at issue, the court held: 
Like the transfer of computer programs 
through the use of punch cards, the use of 
the tangible medium of typed mailing lists 
is merely incidental to the use of the 
incorporeal information contained in those 
lists. The typed lists themselves were not 
used within the contemplation of the 
statute; what was used was the information 
contained in the lists. Such use, in our 
opinion, is not taxable under the current 
statute. 
Id. at 610. 
In Mertz v. State Tax Commission, 89 A.D.2d 396, 456 
N.Y.S.2d 501 (1982), the court held that mailing lists recorded 
on magnetic computer tape were "merely the me4ium by which the 
information that was the essence of the transaction was 
transmitted.ff Id. at 503. The court accordingly held that 
there was no sale of tangible personal property. Id. 
I 
The same result is required in the ptesent case, which 
involves nearly identical facts to Spencer Gifts, Fingerhut, 
and Mertz, the only difference being that the brokers in the 
present case also provide demographic research services for the 
Company in connection with categorizing the lists that are 
transferred. 
Although the undisputed evidence demonstrated that the 
mailing lists were not "raw" or "canned" lists, but were 
refined by the broker through the use of selects, the same 
result should obtain even if the Company purchased only "raw" 
lists. Moreover, even though the same list n^ ay be sold by a 
broker to more than one purchaser, it does not mean that the 
broker performed any less of a service, or that the information 
somehow becomes tangible personal property. In First National 
Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 54$ (Tex.Civ.App. 
1979), the court rejected the state's argument that certain 
computer software contained on magnetic tape should be taxed 
because they were "canned" standard items sold to numerous 
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customers. Holding that the sale of the software was not 
taxable, the court disagreed that the distinction between 
canned and customized programs was valid. "The test in each 
case," stated the court, "is not whether the product is 
'customized' or 'canned,' but whether the object of the sale is 
tangible personal property." lid. at 550. 
The court in First National Bank of Springfield v. 
Dept. of Revenue, 85 111. 2d 84, 421 N.E.2d 175 (1981), also 
declined to hold that the sale of "canned" computer programs on 
magnetic tape was a taxable event. The court refused to "draw 
such an artificial distinction" between custom and prewritten 
software. Id. at 178. Other courts have similarly held that 
informational reports or mailing lists were not tangible 
personal property in spite of the apparent "canned" nature of 
the information. See Washington Times-Herald v. District of 
Columbia, 213 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (comic strip mats sold 
by syndicate to newspaper); Fingerhut Products Co. v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, 258 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 1977) (typed 
mailing lists); Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Director, Division of 
Taxation, 182 N.J. Super. 179, 440 A.2d 104 (1981) (mailing 
lists on magnetic tape); Mertz v. State Tax Commissioner, 89 
A.D. 396, 456 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1982)(mailing lists on magnetic 
tape); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. City of New York, 276 N.Y. 
198, 11 N.E.2d 728 (1937) (credit reports); Williams & Lee 
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Scouting Service, 452 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. A£p. 1970)(oil and 
gas scouting reports). 
B. Computer software is analogous to majLling lists and 
is treated as an intangible by the majority of 
courts. 
The courts in Spencer Gifts and Fingerhut each 
analogized mailing list information to computer software. The 
analogy is helpful in considering whether thei transfer of a 
mailing list is of tangible personal property. Courts that 
2 have so ruled with respect to computer software have 
emphasized the following factors, each of whi[ch is equally 
applicable to the present question regarding(mailing lists: 
1. Tapes and cards are incidental to the 
transfer of information. The "real object" ^r "essence" of 
transactions involving magnetic tape or cards is the transfer 
of information. Once the information has been conveyed from a 
2 
The great majority of cases that have addressed the 
question of the tangibility of computer software have held that 
software is not taxable as tangible personal property. See 
Honeywell Information Systems v. Maricopa County, 118 Ariz. 
171, 575 P.2d 801, 803 (1977) ("There is little doubt that 
computer software is intangible property. . . . [Ejvery 
jurisdiction which has considered the issue agrees"); James v. 
TRES Computer Systems, Inc., 642 S.W.2d 347, 348 (Mo. 1982) 
(en banc) (most courts that have addressed tihe issue have ruled 
that the intangibility of data and programs is not lost because 
of their presence on tapes). See also Note, "Software and 
Sales Taxes: the Illusory Intangible," 63 B.U.L. Rev. 181, 
186 (1983) ("Every court that has addressed the issue of 
tangibility has held that software is intangible"). 
tape to a computer the tape is discarded, erased, or returned. 
This is exactly what the Company does in the present case when 
it is finished with a tape. As with many software 
transactions, the Company is required by its contracts with the 
brokers not to make more than a one-time use of the tapes it 
receives. (Tr. 13-14, 47.) Once the information is taken from 
the magnetic tape and put into the computer, the information is 
treated as totally separate from the tape. The information 
cannot be used again, but the tapes can. As Mr. Tolman 
testified at the hearing before the Tax Commission, "I mean, we 
can't use the information on the mag tape again or we could get 
ourselves in a lot of trouble, but we can use the mag tape 
itself for other computer purposes." (Tr. 47, 12). The 
distinction between the magnetic tape and the information 
encoded on it is emphasized by the fact that the taxpayer is 
charged separately for the tape. Most of what the taxpayer 
pays to the list brokers is for the services rendered and the 
resultant information. The brokers charge a $15 to $25 fee for 
the tape itself, separate and apart from the mailing list 
information. (Tr. 47.) 
Courts have emphasized in the software cases that the 
magnetic tapes and punched cards are only the media through 
which the transfer of information is accomplished. In Commerce 
Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976), the court 
held that the software at issue was not tangible personal 
property, even though it was sold on magnetic! tape: 
When the information is transferred from the 
tape to the computer, the tape is no longer 
of any value to the user; and it is not 
retained in the possession of the u^er. The 
information on the tape, unlike the phono-
graph record, is not complete and ready to 
be used at the time of its purchase. It 
must be translated into a language Understood 
by the computer. Once this information has 
been translated and introduced into the 
computer and the tapes returned or the punch 
cards destroyed, what actually remains in 
the computer is intangible knowledge; this 
is what was purchased, not the magnetic 
tapes or the punch cards. . . . Transfer of 
tangible personal property under these 
circumstances is merely incidental jt^ T~the 
purchase of the intangible knowledge and 
information stored on the tapes. 
Id. at 497 (emphasis added). See District of Columbia v. 
Universal Computer Associates, Inc., 465 F.2ld 615, 617 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972) (punched cards of insignificant value compared with 
the information stored on the cards); State v. Central Computer 
Services, Inc. , 349 So.2d 1160, 1162 (Ala. ][977) (held that 
the commingling of intangible information with tangible tapes 
and cards was incidental); First National BJnk of Springfield 
v. Dept. of Revenue, 85 111.2d 84, 421 N.E.^d 175, 179 (1981) 
(held that the magnetic tapes were not the $ubject of the 
transaction, but the information); University Microfilms v. 
Scio Township, 76 Mich. App. 616, 257 N.W.2d 265, 267 (1977) 
("the value of computer 'softwear' [sic] is not in the card or 
disc itself, but rather in the synthesization, compilation, 
organization and creation of the computer programs contained 
therein"); James v. TRES Computer Service, Inc., 642 S.W.2d 
347, 349 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (held that the tapes were only a 
medium to convey the data and were incidental to the transfer 
of intangible information). 
2. The information can be transferred by 
alternate means. The fact that the information on the 
magnetic tapes and printed lists may be transferred by other 
means lends support to the conclusion that the essence of the 
transaction involves an intangible. To the Company the 
important thing is the receipt of the information. The 
magnetic tapes and printed lists merely facilitate the 
conveyance of that information. The court in Spencer Gifts, 
Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 182 N.J.Super. 179, 
440 A.2d 104 (1981), observed that the magnetic tapes were an 
"inconsequential part of the transaction." The court found 
support for its holding in the fact that "it is possible to 
dispense with the delivery of tapes altogether and to transmit 
the mailing list information by telephone from one computer to 
another." Id. at 118. "Under such circumstances," concluded 
the court, "the form of delivery of the information should not 
control its taxability." Id. Similarly, in Fingerhut Products 
Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 258 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 1977), 
the court stated that the mailing lists there at issue "could 
have been transmitted orally by telephone, or someone could 
have contacted the broker and manually copied) the information 
from the broker's lists/1 Id. at 609. 
Courts have uniformly adopted this rationale in 
holding that sales of software and computer djata are not 
taxable transactions. See James v. TRES Computer Service, 
Inc. , 642 S.W.2d at 349 (the information beiiig bought need not 
have been put on tape, but could have been f^ d directly into 
the computer through electronic communications); Commerce 
Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d at 406-07, 408 (the same 
information on the tape could have been transmitted by 
telephone lines or fed directly into the computer); First 
National Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548, 550 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (the information on the tapes could have 
been programmed by telephone or by hand); Bqllock v. 
Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Tex. 1977) 
(the information on the cards could have be^n ''transformed into 
several forms"). 
C. Mailing lists are not analogous to phonograph 
records, books, or films. 
The Tax Commission argued below th^ it the taxation of 
phonograph records, books, and films is analogous to the 
present situation involving magnetic tape and printed pages. 
The analogy breaks down, however, when one considers that the 
real object of a purchase of record, book, or film is the 
ownership of the particular item. The magnetic tapes and 
printed pages used by the Company are used merely to transfer 
information after which their value is minimal. Once the 
information is transferred from the tape to the computer, the 
tape may be used over, for other purposes, while the 
information may only be used once. The information and the 
tape, at that point, are entirely separate and distinct. (Tr. 
12, 47.) 
Courts have uniformly drawn a distinction between 
records, books, and films, on the one hand, and magnetic tapes 
or other media whose purpose is merely to convey information, 
on the other hand. The tapes and lists at issue in the present 
case are treated in fact as only a means of conveying the list 
of names. They are subordinate to the intangible information 
which is the object of the sale. Records and books are not 
analogous. Consumers are not given the limited kind of rights 
in the use of the book that plaintiff is given in the mailing 
lists. No separate fee is stated for the paper or plastic used 
to make the book or record. The contents of a book or record 
never become separate and distinct from the paper or plastic. 
The court in First National Bank of Springfield v. 
Dept. of Revenue, 85 111.2d 84, 421 N.E.2d 175 (1981), 
addressed a similar argument that computer software ought to be 
taxed similarly to phonograph records and boojcs. The court 
rejected the contention, stating: 
The tapes were certainly not the only medium 
through which the information could be 
transferred. In this way, the tapes differ 
from a movie film, a phonograph record or a 
book, whereby the media used are the only 
practicable ways of preserving those 
articles. Thus, while those articles and 
the tapes are similar in that they 
physically represent the transfer of ideas 
or artistic processes, a more significant 
distinction is that those articles ire 
inseparable from the ideas or processes, 
whereas computer programs are separable from 
the tapes. 
Id. at 178. 
In Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, £38 S.W.2d 405 
(Tenn. 1976), the court rejected the same argument in holding 
that the taxpayer's purchase of magnetic tapfes and punch cards 
was not taxable. The court considered whether ot was a 
finished product that was created and sold, as opposed to 
information. Id. at 407. The court observed that the 
purchase of a magnetic computer tape, which (could only be used 
once, was unlike the purchase of a phonograph record: 
One who buys a phonograph record intends to 
obtain possession of a tangible it$m. Granted 
the sound which emanates from the yecord when it 
is played is the object of the purchase; but the 
purchaser has no other viable method of bringing 
the music of, say, Caruso into his living room. 
The phonograph record remains in the possession 
of the purchaser after its purchase, both during 
periods of use and non-use. 
The instant case presents a different 
situation. A magnetic tape is only one method 
whereby information may be transmitted from the 
originator to the computer of the user. That 
same information may be transmitted from the 
originator to the user by way of telephone lines 
or it may be fed into the user's computer 
directly by the originator of the program. 
When the information is transferred from the 
tape to the computer, the tape is no longer of 
any value to the user; and it is not retained in 
the possession of the user. The information on 
the tape, unlike the phonograph record, is not 
complete and ready to be used at the time of its 
purchase. It must be translated into a language 
understood by the computer. Once this 
information has been translated and introduced 
into the computer and the tapes returned or the 
punch cards destroyed, what actually remains in 
the computer is intangible knowledge; this is 
what was purchased not the magnetic tapes or the 
punch cards. . . . Transfer of tangible personal 
property under these circumstances is merely 
incidental to the purchase of the intangible 
knowledge and information stored on the tapes. 
Id. at 408 (emphasis added; citation omitted). 
Other courts have similarly distinguished 
information-bearing tapes, cards, and lists from phonograph 
records, books, and films. See District of Columbia v. 
Universal Computer Associates, Inc., 465 F.2d 615, 618 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972) (distinguishes computer cards, tapes, and discs from 
films); State v. Central Computer Services, Inc., 349 So.2d 
1160, 1162 (Ala. 1977) (distinguishes tapes and cards from 
movie films; the right to publish or broadcast the motion 
picture is "physically inseparable from the m<>vie film 
itself1'); James v. TRES Computer Service, Incj. 642 S.W.2d 347, 
350 (Mo. 1982) (distinguishes magnetic tapes from films and 
records; the "physical presence of the movie film is essential 
to broadcasting the intangible artistic efforts of the 
actors"); First National Bank of Fort Worth v[. Bullock, 584 
S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) ("Unlike a phonograph 
record or filmstrip, when the information on the tape, in the 
present case, is transferred to the computei ,j the tape is no 
longer of any value or importance to the use^"). 
The Company urges the Court to adopt the same 
rationale as in these analogous cases involving computer 
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software and hold that the mailing list information used by 
the Company was intangible and not subject t<t> taxation. 
D. The use of tapes and printed lists is not a use 
of "tangible personal property" und^r the Utah 
statute, 
3 
The Internal Revenue Service has characterized 
software as intangible, although in a different context than 
1 § 4, 1969-2 C.B. 
\o urged the posi-
personal property taxation. Rev. Proc. 69-21 
303. Several academic commentators have aisle 
tion that computer software is an intangible and should not be 
subject to personal property taxation. See heinzman, "Computer 
Software: Should it be Treated as Tangible Property for Ad 
Valorem Tax?" 37 J. of Taxation 184 (Sept. 1972); Bryant & 
Mather, "Property Taxation of Computer Software," 18 N.Y.L.F. 
61 (1972); Note, "The Revolt Against the Prdperty Tax on 
Software: An Unnecessary Conflict Growing Qut of Unbundling," 
9 Suff. L. Rev. 118 (1974). 
The Tax Commission may argue that Utah Code Ann. § 
59-16-3 is broader in scope than the statutes of other states 
that have held that mailing lists are not "tangible personal 
property." The Tax Commission, by regulation, has defined 
tangible personal property as follows: 
Tangible personal property embraces all goods, 
wares, merchandise, produce, and commodities, all 
tangible or corporeal things and substances which 
are dealt in or capable of being possessed or 
exchanged. It does not include real estate or 
any interest therein or improvements thereon nor 
does it include bank accounts, stocks, bonds, 
mortgages, notes and other evidence of debt, 
insurance certificates or policies, personal or 
governmental licenses. The term does not include 
water in pipes, conduits, ditches or reservoirs 
but does include water in bottles, tanks or other 
containers. Tangible personal property includes 
all other physically existing articles or things 
including property severed from real estate. A 
sales or use tax is imposed on the sale of 
tangible personal property. 
4 
Utah State Tax Commission Reg. A12-02-526. 
^Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(13)(a) (1987) now 
defines "tangible personal property" as meaning: 
(i) all goods, wares, merchandise, produce, 
and commodities; 
(ii) all tangible or corporeal things and 
substances which are dealt in or capable of being 
possessed or exchanged; 
(iii) water in bottles, tanks, or other 
containers; and 
(iv) all other physically existing articles 
or things, including property severed from real 
estate. 
Although Tax Commission Regulation AJ|Z-UZ-!>2b does not 
specifically limit the definition of tangible property to 
objects that can be perceived with the senses, the word 
"tangible" is itself limiting. This Court ha? stated that "the 
terms of a statute are used advisedly and should are given an 
interpretation and application which is in actord with their 
usually accepted meanings." Board of Education v. Salt Lake 
County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983). The usually accepted 
meaning of the word "tangible" according to Websters Third New 
International Dictionary (1976) is "capable of being touched: 
able to be perceived as materially existent ^sp. by the sense 
of touch." This definition is supported by t}he regulation, 
i 
which indicates that tangible personal property embraces "all 
goods, wares, merchandise, produce, and commodities, all 
tangible or corporeal things and substances vfrhich are dealt in 
or capable of being possessed or exchanged." In the context of 
this definition, the mailing list informatioi(i used by the 
Company clearly falls outside the definitional parameters of 
the statute, which evidences a clear legislative intent to tax 
only personal property that can be touched rt^ otherwise 
perceived by the sense. 
E. The mailing lists were treated as intangibles 
by the parties and are generally so treated in 
business contexts. 
In the context of competitive torts "customer lists" 
have been recognized as trade secrets, which} are a form of 
intangible property. The lists in the present case have the 
same characteristics of intangibility and were treated as trade 
secrets by the parties. "Written customer lists generally have 
been regarded as trade secrets when the nature of the industry 
permits the list to be kept secret and the list cannot readily 
be duplicated by independent means." Developments in The Law 
-- Competitive Torts, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 888, 955 (1964). In 
Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 696 
(Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that a trade 
secret is "a type of intellectual property5 in effect> a 
property right in discovered knowledge.ft (Emphasis added). 
See Leo Silfen, Inc., v. Cream, 29 N.Y.2d 387, 278 N.E.2d 
636, 328 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1972) (court held that customer lists 
may be protected as trade secrets where the customers are not 
known in the trade, and are discoverable only by extraordinary 
efforts); Abbott Laboratories v. Norse Chemical Corp. 33 Wis. 
2d 445, 147 N.W. 2d 529, 538 (1967) (court held that customer 
lists may be protected as trade secrets where the list is 
secret and not readily duplicated by independent means); 
Olschewski v. Hudson, 262 P. 43 (Cal. App. 1927) (court held 
that "a list of laundry customers is a property right which may 
be appropriately protected, but it is not a tangible right" 
(Emphas is added)). 
In the present case both the Company and the list 
brokers treated the mailing lists as if they ^ere intangible 
property. First, the seller restricted the taxpayer's use of 
the information sold, but was not concerned ^bout reuse of the 
physical object sold, namely the magnetic ta^e, once the 
information was erased. (Tr. 12-13, 47.) Second, the value of 
the tangible means of exchange was slight in comparison to the 
value of the list, and was separately stated and charged on the 
bill to the taxpayer. (Tr. 47, 49.) Third it was possible to 
obtain the information by alternate means. The Company 
specified, as a matter of convenience, the method by which it 
preferred to receive the lists of names. 
Since the mailing lists are generally recognized as 
intangible property in legal and business contexts generally, 
they ought to be treated consistently by thej taxing authority. 
See Fingerhut, 258 N.W.2d at 609. 
IV. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-16-3 MU^T BE 
STRICTLY CONSTRUED AND AMBIGUITIES 
RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE TAXPAYER. 
The essential difficulty in this c^se is that section 
59-16-3 simply was not designed for the computer age. Notions 
of tangibility, while perhaps once useful ixi determining what 
should be taxed, are outmoded in the context of transfers of 
information by magnetic computer tape. Utal[i Code Ann. § 
59-16-3, at best, is ambiguous and, being so, should be 
resolved in favor of the taxpayer. The rule in Utah, as in 
other jurisdictions, is that "statutes imposing taxes and 
prescribing tax procedures should generally be construed 
favorably to the taxpayer and strictly against the taxing 
authority." Builders Components Supply Co. v. Cockayne, 22 
Utah 2d 172, 450 P.2d 97, 99 (1969). See also Continental 
Telephone Company of Utah v. State Tax Commission, 539 P.2d 
447, 450 (Utah 1975). 
The court in Spencer Gifts, in considering the 
ambiguities of the statute under which it was urged that 
mailing lists ought to be taxed as tangible personal property, 
held that the statute must be resolved in favor of the 
taxpayer. 440 A.2d at 120. The opinion considered the 
difficulty in resolving the questions of tangibility at issue: 
It is not sensible to apply concepts such as 
tangible and intangible, applicable to a very 
different world, to the computer world. Even the 
distinction between property and services is not 
helpful here where definitions appropriate to the 
subject matter of the tax are needed. Signifi-
cant tax burdens should not be predicated on 
largely irrelevant concepts developed in 
different times for different purposes. 
Id. (emphasis added). Other courts have similarly ruled 
The court stated in conclusion that ff[i]t doesn't 
make sense to predicate significant consequences on the outcome 
of debates regarding largely irrelevant concepts developed in 
different times for different purposes." 440 A.2d at 104 
(quoting Wessel, Freedom's Edge, "Controlling the Computer," 
126 (1974)). 
that tax statutes must be resolved in favor of taxpayers where 
the issues involved transfers of information (by magnetic tapes 
or cards, such as software. See First National Bank of 
Springfield v. Dept. of Revenue, 85 111.2d 84, 421 N.E.2d 175, 
177 (1981); First National Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 
S.W.2d 548, 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Jamesville Data Center, 
Inc., 84 Wis. 2d 341, 267 N.W.2d 656, 658 (1^78). 
The pertinent Utah statute should similarly be 
resolved against the taxing authority and inj favor of the 
Company. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the taxpayer purchased information resulting 
from a service rendered by mailing list brokers, which was 
separate and distinct from the tape and the labels by which the 
information was communicated, this Court should hold that the 
purchases by the taxpayer during the period Jat issue were not 
taxable and that the taxpayer is entitled tp a refund of 
$7,750.00. Any ambiguities in the statute should be resolved 
in favor of the taxpayer. 
ADDENDUM 
The taxpayer has appended to this brief copies of the 
following documents: 
1. Lower court's Memorandum Decision dated Mav 12. 
1987 (R. 103-10). 
2. Lower court's Order Disposing of Reciprocal 
Motions for Summary Judgment and Affirming Decision of Utah 
State Tax Commission. (R. 120-25.) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT^
 Dr/onH^ e^ nieru3rdDist.Court 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF XRPAll *" "vj '^t$$U**~ 
MARK 0. HAROLDSON, i 
dba MARKO ENTERPRISES, ! 
a Utah Corporation, J 
Plaintiff, 
v. : 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant. 
1 — 
: MEMORANDUM DECISION 
! CIVIL NO. C85-3384 
Before the court are reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment 
wherein this court is asked to review a decision of the Utah 
State Tax Commission regarding the assessment of "use taxes.11 
The matter came before the court on a special setting for 
argument of the issues. Prior to the hearing on the matter, both 
parties submitted Memoranda in support of their respective 
positions. The court has also received the complete record from 
the Utah State Tax Commission which has l^een marked as Court's 
Exhibit One and made a part of the court's official file. After 
hearing argument of counsel, the court took the matter under 
advisement to further consider the authorities cited by the 
respective parties and to further examine the record from the 
Utah State Tax Commission. The material facts in this case are 
not in dispute. The court has now had an opportunity to consider 
this matter and being otherwise fully advised, enters the 
following Memorandum Decision. 
The plaintiff has appealed from a decision of the Utah State 
OOO^GC 
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Tax Commission which assessed use taxes against the value of 
mailing lists used in the course of his business. The issue to 
be resolved is whether the sales of these lists, in the form of 
printed sheets and computer tapes, are subject to sales and use 
taxes as tangible personal property. The plaintiff argues that 
the transactions involved the sale of services, and that any 
transfer of tangible personal property was incidental to the sale 
of intangible property. The Tax Commission takes the position 
that any services provided were incidental to the sale of 
tangible personal property. It is the opijnion of the court that 
these lists are tangible personal property, and that their sale 
or use is subject to taxation. 
Both parties have moved for summary judgment, and the 
undisputed facts, briefly stated, are as follows. The plaintiff 
is a Utah corporation engaged in the marketing of real estate 
information. As a marketing technique, the plaintiff purchases 
mailing lists from mailing list brokers to use in direct mail 
advertising. These lists are generated by the brokers based on 
the target market specified by the plaintiff. Such factors as 
age, sex, income level, family status, and investment history are 
used to define those individuals selected to receive the 
plaintiff's advertising. The completed lists are delivered to 
the plaintiff for a one-time usage,1 and ttyey are contained in 
xMailing lists are commonly "salted" With names of employees 
of the broker to detect unauthorized use or the list. 
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either printed sheets or computer tapes. The printed sheets are 
converted into mailing labels by a machine that cuts the names 
from the sheet and gums them, and the computer tapes are read by 
word processing equipment that prints the labels. Approximately 
thirty-five percent of the lists purchased) by the plaintiff were 
on computer tape, and sixty-five percent yere on printed sheets. 
Of the $154,844.10 paid by the plaintiff fd>r these lists, the Tax 
Commission assessed a use tax deficiency of $19,711.21, plus 
interest and penalty. The plaintiff has paid about $15,000, and 
approximately $7,750 remains in dispute. 
This inquiry focuses on the language of the Use Tax Act of 
1937, Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-1, et seq. (1953). The scope of 
the use tax is defined in § 59-16-3(a) (Subp. 1986), which states 
that an excise tax shall be levied upon the "storage, use, or 
other consumption of tangible personal prpperty . . . ." Tangible 
personal property is defined in the Utah Sales and Tax Book of 
Regulations as "all tangible or corporeal things . . . capable of 
being possessed or exchanged." Tax Reg. A12-02-S26. Although 
this definition provides little assistance, it is clear that 
tangible personal property does not include such intangibles as 
services. 
The line of demarcation between tangible and intangible 
property is not always clear. Courts grappling with this 
question have examined the "real object" sought by the buyer to 
determine whether the buyer's object was to obtain an act by an 
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individual chosen for his skill, or whether it was the buyer's 
object to obtain a product not dependent on the skills of the 
individual providing it. Accountant's Computer Serv. v. Koysdar, 
298 N.E.2d 519, 527, 35 Ohio St.2d 120 (1973). If the true 
object of the contract is the service per se, the transaction is 
not subject to tax even though some tangible personal property is 
transferred incidental to the transaction. 
The problem is that many transactions involve an inseparable 
combination of services and tangible personal property. 
Accountant' s involved three cases that we^ re disposed of in the 
following manner: 
1. A data processing firm was supplied by the taxpayer 
with raw data. The firm transcribed in onto punch cards, and the 
cards were sorted, classified and arranged. The cards were then 
delivered to the taxpayer. This transaction was found to be a 
taxable sale of a product accompanied by an inconsequential 
personal service. Id. at 527-28. 
2. The additional service of data analysis transformed the 
transaction to a nontaxable service transaction. The delivery of 
printed matter in the form of a report wa^ determined to be the 
inconsequential element of the transaction. Id. at 528. 
3. A market research company compiled statistical data and 
analyzed it for presentation to clients. Again the court found a 
service transaction that was exempt from taxation, stating "it 
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was the intellectual and manual personal Efforts . . . that was 
sought . . . not the inconsequential tangible personal property 
which was transferred, for purposes of communication, as an 
incidental element without a separate charge." Id. at 520. 
Other jurisdictions, including Utah, have applied this 
reasoning in different factual contexts, yhorne and Wilson, Inc. 
v. Utah State Tax Commission, 681 P.2d 3J237, 1238 (Utah 1984) 
("it is the substance of the transaction and not the property 
actually transferred that controls.11); Olft West Realty v. Idaho 
State Tax Commission. 716 P2. 1318 (Idaho 1986) (transfer of 
multiple listing books from listing service to real estate broker 
was a taxable transaction) . In the present case it seems clear 
that the generation of the lists for the taxpayer involved little 
expertise, marketing skill or analysis on the part of the broker. 
Although the plaintiff did consult the mailing list broker to a 
limited extent, the purpose was to define the parameters of the 
desired list, and this was done primarily ^y the plaintiff. The 
court finds that this service was incidental to the generation of 
the lists, which were the real object of tlfie transaction. There 
still remains the question of whether thejse sales involved the 
transfer of tangible or intangible personal property. 
Regarding the printed sheets, it is clear that a sale of 
tangible personal property has occurred4 These lists were 
processed by a machine that converted them to gummed labels, and 
HAROLDSON V. TAX COMMISSION PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
they were affixed to the taxpayer's mailings. The tax imposed on 
the use of these lists was proper. Fincrerhut Products Co. v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, 258 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 1977) sale of 
mailing lists in the form of gummed labels constituted taxable 
sale of tangible personal property) ; Matter of Alan Drev Co. v. 
State Tax Commission, 67 A.D.2d 1055, 41p N.Y.S.2d 516 (1979) 
(same)• 
Turning to the transfer of the computer tapes a more 
difficult question is presented. Courts have distinguished 
gummed mailing labels from computer tape$ in refusing to find 
computer tapes tangible personal property. Mertz v. State Tax 
Commission. 89 A.D.2d 396, 456 N.Y.S.2d 501, 503 (1982) ("the 
tapes . . . were merely the medium by which the information that 
was the essence of the transaction was transmitted."); Spencer 
Giftsf Inc. v. Taxation Div. Director, 18|2 N.J. Super 179, 440 
A.2d 104, 117 (N.J. Tax 1981) ("The leasing of computer 
information is not the leasing or sale of tangible personal 
property and is not taxable."); Fincreyhut Products Co. v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, 258 N.W.2d 606, ^1° (Minn. 1977) ("the 
use of the tangible medium of typed mailing lists is merely 
incidental to the use of the incorporeal information contained in 
those lists."). 
It is the opinion of this court that these prior cases have 
made a distinction where there is no practical difference. 
Whether the information is supplied on gummed labels, typed 
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lists, or computer tape, an item of tangible personal property is 
transferred, and the transaction is taxable. Although the 
information contained by the tapes is incorporeal, it cannot be 
possessed without some item of tangible perjsonal property, and it 
is of no value to the user until it is transformed into a 
tangible mailing label. It is not dimply the intangible 
information that the taxpayer seeks, but the list in the form of 
mailing labels. The value of the media is determined by the 
information it contains, and in this respect the sale of 
information on a computer tape is no different from the sale of 
the same information contained in a book. The ruling of the Tax 
Commission is affirmed. 
Counsel for the Tax Commission is reguested to prepare an 
appropriate Order in accordance with this Memorandum Decision and 
submit the same to the court for review andi signature as provided 
in the local rules of practice. 
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! MEMORANDUM DECISION 
: CIVIL NO- C85-3384 
Before the court are reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment 
wherein this court is asked to review a decision of the Utah 
State Tax Commission regarding the assessment of "use taxes." 
The matter came before the court on a special setting for 
argument of the issues. Prior to the hearihg on the matter, both 
parties submitted Memoranda in support of their respective 
positions. The court has also received the! complete record from 
the Utah State Tax Commission which has b^en marked as Court's 
Exhibit One and made a part of the courtfs Official file. After 
hearing argument of counsel, the court took the matter under 
advisement to further consider the authorities cited by the 
respective parties and to further examine the record from the 
Utah State Tax Commission. The material facts in this case are 
not in dispute. The court has now had an opportunity to consider 
this matter and being otherwise fully Advised, enters the 
following Memorandum Decision. 
The plaintiff has appealed from a decision of the Utah State 
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Tax Commission which assessed use taxes against the value of 
mailing lists used in the course of his business. The issue to 
be resolved is whether the sales of these lists, in the form of 
printed sheets and computer tapes, are subject to sales and use 
taxes as tangible personal property. The plaintiff argues that 
the transactions involved the sale of services, and that any 
transfer of tangible personal property was incidental to the sale 
of intangible property. The Tax Commission takes the position 
that any services provided were incidental to the sale of 
tangible personal property. It is the opinion of the court that 
these lists are tangible personal property, and that their sale 
or use is subject to taxation. 
Both parties have moved for summary judgment, and the 
undisputed facts, briefly stated, are as follows. The plaintiff 
is a Utah corporation engaged in the marketing of real estate 
information. As a marketing technique, the plaintiff purchases 
mailing lists from mailing list brokers to use in direct mail 
advertising. These lists are generated by the brokers based on 
the target market specified by the plaintiff. Such factors as 
age, sex, income level, family status, and investment history are 
used to define those individuals selected to receive the 
plaintifffs advertising. The completed lists are delivered to 
the plaintiff for a one-time usage,1 and they are contained in 
xMailing lists are commonly ••salted" with names of employees 
of the broker to detect unauthorized use of the list. 
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either printed sheets or computer tapes, the printed sheets are 
converted into mailing labels by a machine that cuts the names 
from the sheet and gums them, and the computer tapes are read by 
word processing equipment that prints the labels. Approximately 
thirty-five percent of the lists purchased by the plaintiff were 
on computer tape, and sixty-five percent were on printed sheets. 
Of the $154,844.10 paid by the plaintiff for these lists, the Tax 
Commission assessed a use tax deficiency of $19,711.21, plus 
interest and penalty. The plaintiff has paid about $15,000, and 
approximately $7,750 remains in dispute. 
This inquiry focuses on the language of the Use Tax Act of 
1937, Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-1, et seq. (1953). The scope of 
the use tax is defined in § 59-16-3(a) (Supp. 1986), which states 
that an excise tax shall be levied upon the "storage, use, or 
other consumption of tangible personal property . . .." Tangible 
personal property is defined in the Utah Skies and Tax Book of 
Regulations as "all tangible or corporeal things . . . capable of 
i 
being possessed or exchanged." Tax Reg. A12-02-S26. Although 
this definition provides little assistance/ it is clear that 
tangible personal property does not include such intangibles as 
services. 
The line of demarcation between tangible and intangible 
property is not always clear. Courts grappling with this 
question have examined the "real object" sought by the buyer to 
determine whether the buyer's object was to,obtain an act by an 
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individual chosen for his skill, or whether it was the buyer's 
object to obtain a product not dependent on the skills of the 
individual providing it. Accountant's Computer Serv. v. Kovsdar, 
298 N.E.2d 519, 527, 35 Ohio St.2d 120 (1973). If the true 
object of the contract is the service per se, the transaction is 
not subject to tax even though some tangible personal property is 
transferred incidental to the transaction. 
The problem is that many transactions involve an inseparable 
combination of services and tangible personal property. 
Accountantf s involved three cases that were disposed of in the 
following manner: 
1. A data processing firm was supplied by the taxpayer 
with raw data. The firm transcribed in onto punch cards, and the 
cards were sorted, classified and arranged. The cards were then 
delivered to the taxpayer. This transaction was found to be a 
taxable sale of a product accompanied by an inconsequential 
personal service. Id. at 527-28. 
2. The additional service of data analysis transformed the 
transaction to a nontaxable service transaction. The delivery of 
printed matter in the form of a report was determined to be the 
inconsequential element of the transaction. Id. at 528. 
3. A market research company compiled statistical data and 
analyzed it for presentation to clients. Again the court found a 
service transaction that was exempt from taxation, stating "it 
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was the intellectual and manual personal efforts . . . that was 
sought . . . not the inconsequential tangible personal property 
which was transferred, for purposes of Communication, as an 
incidental element without a separate chargel.11 Id. at 520. 
Other jurisdictions, including Utah, have applied this 
reasoning in different factual contexts. Tfoorne and Wilson, Inc. 
v. Utah State Tax Commission, 681 P.2d 1237, 1238 (Utah 1984) 
(ffit is the substance of the transaction land not the property 
actually transferred that controls.M); Old West Realty v. Idaho 
State Tax Commission, 716 P2. 1318 (Idaho 1986) (transfer of 
multiple listing books from listing service to real estate broker 
was a taxable transaction) . In the present case it seems clear 
that the generation of the lists for the taxpayer involved little 
expertise, marketing skill or analysis on thte part of the broker. 
Although the plaintiff did consult the mailing list broker to a 
limited extent, the purpose was to define the parameters of the 
desired list, and this was done primarily b^ r the plaintiff. The 
court finds that this service was incidental to the generation of 
the lists, which were the real object of the transaction. There 
still remains the question of whether thes£ sales involved the 
transfer of tangible or intangible personal property. 
Regarding the printed sheets, it is clear that a sale of 
tangible personal property has occurred. These lists were 
processed by a machine that converted them to gummed labels, and 
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they were affixed to the taxpayerfs mailings. The tax imposed on 
the use of these lists was proper. Finaerhut Products Co. v. 
Commissioner of Revenue. 258 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 1977) sale of 
mailing lists in the form of gummed labels constituted taxable 
sale of tangible personal property) ; Matter of Alan Drev Co. v. 
State Tax Commission, 67 A.D.2d 1055, 413 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1979) 
(same). 
Turning to the transfer of the computer tapes a more 
difficult question is presented. Courts have distinguished 
gummed mailing labels from computer tapes in refusing to find 
computer tapes tangible personal property. Mertz v. State Tax 
Commission. 89 A.D.2d 396, 456 N.Y.S.2d 501, 503 (1982) ("the 
tapes . . . were merely the medium by which the information that 
was the essence of the transaction was transmitted."); Spencer 
Gifts. Inc. v. Taxation Div. Director. 182 N.J. Super 179, 440 
A. 2d 104, 117 (N.J. Tax 1981) ("The leasing of computer 
information is not the leasing or sale of tangible personal 
property and is not taxable."); Finaerhut Products Co. v. 
Commissioner of Revenue. 258 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Minn. 1977) ("the 
use of the tangible medium of typed mailing lists is merely 
incidental to the use of the incorporeal information contained in 
those lists."). 
It is the opinion of this court that these prior cases have 
made a distinction where there is no practical difference. 
Whether the information is supplied on gummed labels, typed 
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lists, or computer tape, an item of tangible personal property is 
transferred, and the transaction is taxable. Although the 
information contained by the tapes is incorporeal, it cannot be 
possessed without some item of tangible pergonal property, and it 
is of no value to the user until it it transformed into a 
tangible mailing label. It is not simply the intangible 
information that the taxpayer seeks, but tl^ e list in the form of 
mailing labels. The value of the media is determined by the 
information it contains, and in this respect the sale of 
information on a computer tape is no different from the sale of 
the same information contained in a book. Jrhe ruling of the Tax 
Commission is affirmed. 
Counsel for the Tax Commission is requested to prepare an 
appropriate Order in accordance with this Memorandum Decision and 
submit the same to the court for review and signature as provided 
in the local rules of practice. 
DATED this /bQ day of May, 19a4. 
IMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARK 0. HAROLDSEN, 
dba MARKO ENTERPRISES, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DISPOSING OF 
RECIPROCAL MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
AFFIRMING DECISION OF 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
Civil No. C85-3384 
(talc case) 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
POSTURE OF THE CASE 
Reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment came on for hearing 
before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson on the 14th day of April, 
1987. R. Stephen Marshall and Steven D. Woodland appeared on 
behalf of the plaintiff, Mark 0. Haroldsen, Ii(ic., Mary Beth Walz, 
Assistant Attorney General, appeared on behalf of the defendant, 
the Utah State Tax Commission. Both parties submitted Memoranda 
in support of their respective positions. Pursuant to the 
r*t\ OOOl.SC 
stipulation of the parties, the complete record of the formal 
hearing before the Utah State Tax Commission was placed before 
the court in lieu of a trial. Exhibits were submitted and 
received* Arguments of counsel were presented* 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff is a Utah corporation engaged in the 
marketing of real estate information. As a marketing technique, 
the plaintiff purchases mailing lists from mailing list brokers 
for use in direct mail advertising. 
2. The lists are marketed by a brokerage agent who narrows 
the raw lists according to a customer's specific requests in 
order to create a list of names targeted towards a particular 
market. Such factors as age, sex, income level, family status, 
and investment history are used to define those individuals 
selected to receive the customer's advertising. 
3. The lists consist of printed sheets or computer tapes 
and are delivered to the plaintiff for a one-time usage. The 
printed sheets are converted into mailing labels by a machine 
that cuts the names from the sheet and gums them, and the 
computer tapes are read by word processing equipment that prints 
the labels. The plaintiff purchased approximately thirty-five 
percent of the lists on computer tape and sixty-five percent on 
printed sheets and paid a total of $154,844.10 for the use of 
these lists. 
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4. The Tax Commission assessed a use tax deficiency of 
$19#711.21, plus interest and penalty. The plaintiff has paid 
about $15,000.00 and approximately $7,750.00 remain in dispute. 
ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW AND APPLICABLE UTAH STATUTES 
1. The Use Tax Act of 1937, Utah Code Anfi. §59-16-
3(a) (Supp. 1986) states that an excise tax shafLl be levied upon 
the "storage, use, or other consumption of tangible personal 
property..." 
2. Tangible personal property is defined in the Utah Sales 
and Tax Book of Regulations as "all tangible or corporeal 
things...capable of being possessed or exchanged." Tax Reg. A12-
02-S26. Tangible personal property does not include such 
intangibles as services. 
3. Courts apply the "real object" test to determine whether 
the buyer's object was to obtain an act by an individual chosen 
for his skill, or whether the buyer sought a product not 
dependent on the skills of the individual providing it. 
Accountant's Computer Servt vt Kosyflarr 35 Ohio 2d 120, 298 
N.E.2d 519, 527 (1973). The Utah Supreme Court has also applied 
this reasoning in a different factual context. Thorne and 
Wilson, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission. 681 P.2d 1237, 1238 
(Utah 1984) ("[lit is the substance of the transaction and not 
the property actually transferred that control^"). Old West 
Realty v. Idaho State Tax Commission. 716 P.2d 1318 (Idaho 1986) 
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(holding that a transfer of multiple listing books from a listing 
service to a real estate broker was a taxable transaction). 
4. In the present case, the generation of the lists 
involved little expertise, marketing skill or analysis on the 
part of the broker. The function of defining the parameters of 
the desired list was done primarily by the plaintiff. The 
service was incidental to the generation of the lists, which were 
the real object of the transaction. 
5. The printed sheets constitute tangible personal 
property. Finaerhut Products Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 258 
N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 1977). 
6. Although some courts distinguish printed sheets from 
computer tapes by saying that the latter is nontangible, these 
cases have made a distinction where there is no practical 
difference. The information contained by the computer tapes, 
while incorporeal, is valueless until possessed in some tangible 
form. The value of the media is determined by the information it 
contains, and in this respect, the sale of information on a 
computer tape is no different from the sale of the same 
information contained in a book. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The mailing lists in the form of printed sheets and in 
the form of computer tapes are tangible personal property within 
the meaning of Tax Reg A12-02-S26 
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2. The service provided by the broker was incidental to the 
transaction to acquire the mailing lists. 
3. The mailing lists were the Mreal object" of the 
transaction. 
4. The sale or use of the mailing lists is subject to 
taxation as stated in U.C.A. §59-16-3(a)(Supp. 1986). 
5. The decision of the Utah Tax Commission is affirmed. 
ORDER 
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and 
the final ruling of the Utah State Tax Commission is affirmed. 
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
3. The appealed use tax assessment in the amount of roughly 
$7#750.00 and the accompanying interest imposed by the Utah State 
Tax Commission against the plaintiff will become )?inal after the 
period for appeal from this order has expired. 
4. This case is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this A^^day of fletober, 1987/ 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
district Court Judge 
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